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Article

Less Is More: A Case for Structural
Reform of the National Labor Relations
Board
†

Zev J. Eigen & Sandro Garofalo

INTRODUCTION
1

The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “Act”),
America’s primary federal labor law, was originally enacted as
part of New Deal legislation in 1935, for the purpose of securing workers’ “right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
2
activities.” With the exception of the Health Care Amendments in 1974, only two major amendments have been made to
the NLRA since its inception: one in 1947 through the Taft3
Hartley Act and one in 1959 by way of the Landrum-Griffin
† Zev J. Eigen is Associate Professor of Law at Northwestern University
School of Law. Sandro Garofalo is Senior Group Manager & Sr. Counsel, Target Corporation. Recognition and thanks is owed to Jim Rowader, Vice President and General Counsel, Employee and Labor Relations at Target, who inspired this article, and without whose leadership the article would not have
been possible. Much thanks is owed to Alison Caverly (Northwestern University Law, class of 2013) for invaluable research assistance, and to Harry Johnson, Paul Secunda, David S. Sherwyn, and Joseph E. Slater for their helpful
feedback and suggestions. Copyright © 2014 by Zev J. Eigen & Sandro
Garofalo.
1. Wagner Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). This statutory provision, which spells out a set
of rights now commonly known as “Section 7” rights, along with Section 8 of
the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a), which prohibits unfair labor practices by employers, constitutes the core of the Wagner Act.
3. Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197). The Taft-Hartley Act
was enacted in an attempt to even the playing field between unions and employers at a time when unions had grown strong and widespread criticism had
arisen over the NLRA’s seemingly one-sided favoritism of unions in the collective bargaining process. See Charles J. Morris, How the National Labor Rela-
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4

Act. Since 1959, the text of the Act has remained essentially
unchanged, except for certain structural changes that apply on5
ly to health care institutions. During the intervening time period, the nature of work, the composition of the American workforce, and the laws and regulations governing employee rights
and employer obligations in the workplace have changed mark6
edly. Commentators have long expressed concern over labor
law’s failure to adapt to a changing economy and called for re-

tions Act Was Stolen and How It Can Be Recovered: Taft-Hartley Revisionism
and the National Labor Relations Board's Appointment Process, 33 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 21–22 (2012). The primary substantive revisions imposed
by the Act were regulatory restrictions on union activity. See id. at 22–23.
4. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act
of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.) (adding provisions spelling out the rights of union members
and imposing regulations on internal union affairs, and making relatively minor revisions to existing labor-management provisions of the Act).
5. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1532–33 (2002). Only minor changes have been made to
the Act since 1959, including a 1970 revision expanding the Act’s coverage to
include the U.S. Postal Service, Postal Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-375,
84 Stat. 719, at 737 (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C. § 1209 (2012)), and a
1974 amendment applicable only to healthcare institutions, Act of July 26,
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395, at 395–96 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 152(14), 158(d) (2012)).
6. See Estlund, supra note 5, at 1535–36 (describing an increasingly diverse workforce, a shift away from the manufacturing industry, technological
developments affecting the nature of work, and changes in production methods
and organizational structure); see also Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal,
1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 375, 375 n.4 (2007) (commenting that the NLRA “has
proven remarkably inept in responding to changes in the composition of the
U.S. labor force, and now entirely excludes from its coverage contingent workers, ‘knowledge’ workers, and undocumented immigrant workers, precisely
those segments of the workforce that increasingly define the labor market”).
For a discussion of state law developments affecting the rights of individual
workers, see Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism:
The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 591–93 (1992). On a national
level, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 651–678 (21012) (establishing minimum health and safety standards for
the workplace), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1146 (2012) (establishing minimum standards for
pension plans in the private sector), the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(4) (2012) (requiring employers to offer unpaid
leave for certain family and medical reasons), and the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act of 1988 (WARN), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2109 (2012)
(requiring qualifying employers to provide advance notice of plant closings and
mass layoffs), have all expanded the basic rights of employees entering into
employment contracts. See James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The
NLRB's Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 221, 228 n.32 (2005).
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forms that would allow the NLRA to better meet the needs of
7
individuals, employers, and organized labor.
While several attempts at significant labor law reform
8
have been made, those efforts have so far failed. Even those
attempts at legislative reform that were able to garner majority
support in both Houses of Congress were ultimately defeated
9
by well-organized minorities in the Senate. In 1977, Congress
10
introduced the pro-union Labor Reform Act, which proposed
several provisions aimed at deterring employer misconduct and
reducing the perceived advantages of employers in union organizing campaigns gained as a result of their superior access
11
to and influence over employees and the workplace. The Labor
Reform Act passed in the House, only to be defeated following a
12
five-week Republican filibuster in the Senate. During the
Clinton Administration, the Cesar Chavez Work-place Fairness
13
Act, which sought to prohibit employers from firing striking
employees, met a similar fate—defeated by an anti-union mi14
nority in the Senate. In 1995, the Republican-backed Team15
work for Employees and Managment Act (TEAM Act), aimed
at amending the NLRA to permit employer-sponsored alterna-

7. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 9 (1993); Estlund, supra note
5; Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening
Up the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827 (1996);
Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for
Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59 (1993); Joel Rogers, Reforming
U.S. Labor Relations, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97 (1993); Sachs, supra note 6;
Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983).
8. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 5, at 1540 (describing significant failed
attempts from the late-1970s and early-1990s).
9. See Brudney, supra note 6, at 228–29 (“[E]ach [legislative attempt]
garnered majority support from both houses of Congress, but in the end each
succumbed to the supermajority requirements of the U.S. Senate.”); Estlund,
supra note 5, at 1540–41 (summarizing several failed legislative attempts at
labor law reform).
10. S. 1883, 95th Cong. (1977). The proposed reforms included a shortened
union election period, increased penalties against employers for engaging in
anti-union activity barred by the NLRA, and greater access to workplaces for
union organizers.
11. See Estlund, supra note 5, at 1540.
12. See id.
13. H.R. 5, 103d Cong. (1993).
14. See Morris, supra note 3, at 13 n.41.
15. S. 295, 104th Cong. (1995).
OF
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tives to union representation, was defeated upon Congress’s
16
failure to override President Clinton’s veto.
Most recently, the Obama Administration proposed the
17
Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), which would have fundamentally changed the process of union recognition. The EFCA
would have required employers to recognize a union as the exclusive representative of its employees for collective bargaining
purposes if the majority of employees signed “authorization
cards” stating that they wished to be represented by the peti18
tioning union. As a matter of practice, this process would all
but replace the traditional method by which unions petition the
19
NLRB for the opportunity to hold a secret-ballot election during which both the employer and the union typically have an
opportunity to campaign for votes and employees cast ballots
20
for or against union representation. Additional provisions of
the EFCA would have increased penalties against employers
21
that violated the NLRA and forced employers and unions to
enter into binding arbitration if a collective agreement was not
22
reached within 120 days of union recognition. Hopes of
EFCA’s passing died in 2010—a result of unexpected changes
in the party composition of the Senate—before the bill was
23
brought to a formal vote in either House.
Past reforms failed for one or both of the following reasons:
(1) they were politically motivated, and therefore politically polarizing; or (2) they were outcome-focused, designed either to
bolster union membership and power or to minimize it, instead
of process- or fairness-oriented. Each of the attempts at legislative reform discussed in the preceding paragraphs illustrates
the near-impossibility of enacting labor law reforms that are
one-sided and partisan in origin. The highly organized nature
16. See Clinton Vetoes TEAM Act Despite Pleas from Business for Passage,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) (July. 31, 1996).
17. S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009).
18. Id. § 2.
19. The National Labor Relations Board is an independent agency established by the NLRA to interpret and administer the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a)
(2012).
20. S. 560 § 2(a).
21. Id. § 4(b)(I).
22. Id. § 3.
23. See Richard D. Kahlenberg & Moshe Z. Marvitd, "Architects of Democracy": Labor Organizing as a Civil Right, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 213, 222
(2013) (citing the surprise election of a Republican to replace late Senator
Kennedy of Massachusetts as the final blow to hope of passing the EFCA in
the Senate).
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of both the pro-union and the pro-employer/anti-union political
contingents and a political system that permits a small minority to block majority-backed legislation combine to virtually
guarantee that politically divisive and results-driven attempts
24
at legislative reform of the NLRA will remain unsuccessful.
Even if such reform could be pushed through Congress, the result would be a temporary, and possibly Pyrrhic, victory for one
side, rather than a lasting solution to more deeply-rooted problems that have contributed to the NLRA’s failures. This Article
argues that successful reform requires not just revision of substantive provisions of the NLRA, but a rethinking of the process by which the Act is administered.
Proposals for labor law reform have thus far typically rested upon normative assumptions regarding the value of unions
in contemporary society. Pro-labor Democratic proposals, operating under the assumption that unionization is good for employees, strive to make it easier for unions to win elections and
ultimately increase union membership. Union membership has
decreased steadily over the past several decades, from its peak
in the 1950s, when about 35% of the workforce was union25
26
represented, to 11.3% in 2013. Currently only about 6.7% of
27
private-sector employees are represented by unions. Prounion commentators and activists have pointed to this decline
as an indication of a failure of the NLRA to serve its original
28
purpose and to meet the evolving needs of the U.S. economy.
Pro-management, anti-union actors, on the other hand, frequently ground their proposals—which seek to minimize the
role of unions and make unionization less attainable—on the
assumption that unions have withered because the American
economy no longer needs them, essentially positing that unions
generate inefficiencies that exacerbate economically unfavora29
ble conditions.
24. See Estlund, supra note 5, at, 1542–44.
25. PAUL OSTERMAN ET AL., WORKING IN AMERICA: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE
NEW LABOR MARKET 46 (2001).
26. News Release, Bureau of Labor Stats., Union Members—2013 (Jan.
24, 2014), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.
27. Id.
28. See Henry H. Drummonds, Beyond the Employee Free Choice Act: Unleashing the States in Labor-Management Relations Policy, 19 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 83, 97 (2009).
29. See id. It is worth noting another common source explanation of union
decline—the growth of laws regulating the workplace based on individual
rights, as opposed to collective rights. See Michael Piore & Sean Safford,
Changing Regimes of Workplace Governance, Shifting Axes of Social Mobiliza-
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This Article suggests that labor law reform that focuses on
the process by which the NLRA is administered is more politically and practically viable than approaches relying on assumptions about the value of unionization. Rather than using unionization rates or union election win-rates to measure the
effectiveness of the NLRA and the fairness of labor law policy,
this approach would judge the NLRA’s effectiveness by the
fairness and stability of labor law decision-making and election
30
processes. Broadly, we propose excision of decision-making
from NLRB jurisdiction on unfair labor practice charge cases
alleging NLRA violations in favor of federal court decisionmaking. Under this model the Board retains jurisdiction of
what it does best: receiving and processing petitions involving
questions concerning representation (QCR) and conducting union elections. In the performance of its QCR duties, the Board
should be limited by an NLRA amendment to developing and
implementing administrative guidance subject to judicial review, not “legislative” (binding) rules subject to the Administrative Procedures Act’s notice-and-comment requirements.
The reform proposed in this Article is founded on the belief
that current problems with the NLRA are largely a result of the
NLRB’s approach to deciding unfair labor practice cases. The
Board’s approach is—some might say “notoriously”—marked by
frequent shifts in precedent when the administration changes,
combined with a policy of non-acquiescence with federal appellate court rulings until the Supreme Court ultimately decides
an issue. In this regard, it is well-established that the NLRA
empowers the Board to engage in both notice-and-comment
rulemaking and adjudication of individual cases (subject to re31
view by the federal courts of appeal). However, the Board has
historically opted to set policy almost entirely through the latter means, generally refusing to propagate concrete rules guid32
ing the interpretation of the NLRA. In the more than seventytion, and the Challenge to Industrial Relations Theory, 45 IND. REL. 299, 320
(2006).
30. For a more in-depth discussion of this process-focused conception of
fairness as it relates to union elections, see Zev J. Eigen & David Sherwyn, A
Moral/Contractual Approach to Labor Law Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 695,
708–13 (2012).
31. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 292–95 (1974); NLRB
v. Wyman-Gordan Co., 394 U.S. 759, 763–64, 772 (1969).
32. See Brudney, supra note 6, at 234. Several possible explanations have
been offered for the NLRB’s strategy, among them that the rulemaking process is time consuming and burdensome, adjudication allows for more frequent
and less administratively burdensome adaptation of rules to new circum-

2014]

LESS IS MORE

1885

five years since its inception the Board has successfully en33
gaged in legislative rulemaking on just a few occasions.
This approach has led to a number of problems. First, the
frequent shift in Board precedent following changes in the administration has left employees, employers, and unions alike
uncertain as to their rights and obligations under the NLRA.
While caselaw may provide some guidance, adjudicative decisions are fact-specific and thus may not be relied on to the
same extent as broad, concrete rules. Second, adjudicative
precedent under the NLRA has proven to be anything but stable. The Board has historically, beyond remand in specific cases, defied appellate court decisions in other cases, refusing to
34
defer to judicial precedent when not strictly required to do so.
Even more problematic is the fact that the NLRB frequently
stance, and adjudication attracts less critical oversight by Congress and the
federal courts than formal rulemaking. See Brief for NLRB at 15, NLRB v.
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969) (No. 463), 1969 WL 1202891, at *15
(commenting on the “Board's judgment that formal rule-making procedures
are, as a general matter, too rigid and inflexible for most of the problems with
which it is concerned”); Emily Baver, Comment, Setting Labor Policy Prospectively: Rulemaking, Adjudicating, and What the NLRB Can Learn from the
NMB's Representation Election Procedure Rule, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 853, 859–65
(2011); Brudney, supra note 6, at 234–35.
33. In the early 1970s, the Board issued a series of rules clarifying jurisdiction standards for symphony orchestras and private colleges and universities, and declining jurisdiction over the horse racing industry. See 29 C.F.R.
§§ 103.1–103.3 (2012). In 1989, the Board promulgated a rule defining bargaining units in health care facilities. Appropriate Bargaining Units in the
Health Care Industry, 29 C.F.R. § 103.30. More recently, the Board under the
Obama Administration has made two attempts at substantive rulemaking. In
2011, the Board issued a final rule which would require employers subject to
the NLRA to post notices of employees’ rights under the Act at the workplace.
Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,008 (Aug. 30, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 104). The rule’s validity has been challenged in federal courts, leading the
NLRB to delay its effective date. See Employee Rights Notice Posting, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/poster (last visited Apr. 1,
2014). An additional rule, Representation—Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg.
80,138 (Dec. 22, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. Pts. 101, 102, 103), which
shortened the union election period went into effect in April of 2012 but was
suspended after being struck down in federal court. See Press Release, NLRB,
NLRB Suspends Implementation of Representation Case Amendments Based
on Court Ruling (May 15, 2012), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news
-outreach/news-story/nlrb-suspends-implementation-representation-case
-amendments-based-court.
34. See Brudney, supra note 6, at 237–38; Rebecca Hanner White, Time
for a New Approach: Why the Judiciary Should Disregard the “Law of the Circuit” When Confronting Nonacquiescence by the National Labor Relations
Board, 69 N.C.L. REV. 639, 642 (1991).
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overrules its own precedent with little explanation other than
changes in the composition of the Board.
The NLRB is composed of five members appointed by the
president, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for five35
year terms. The Board operates through regional offices managed by regional directors who receive election petitions, direct
and conduct union elections, and investigate and make cause
determinations when unfair labor practice charges are filed. In
the latter regard, when cause is found a complaint is filed and
the Board’s Office of the General Counsel prosecutes the complaint before an administrative law judge. Ultimately, an appeal of the Board’s decisions on certain representational issues
and unfair labor practice charges is available in the federal appellate courts with potential U.S Supreme Court review thereafter through a “petition for review.”
The Board operates through regional offices managed by
regional directors who receive election petitions, direct and
conduct union elections, and investigate and make cause de36
terminations when unfair labor practice charges are filed. In
the latter regard, when cause is found a complaint is filed and
the Board’s Office of the General Counsel prosecutes the com37
plaint before an administrative law judge. Ultimately, an appeal of the Board’s decisions on certain representational issues
and unfair labor practice charges is available in the federal appellate courts with potential U.S Supreme Court review there38
after through a “petition for review.”
As initially conceived, the Board was to be made up of
39
“strictly nonpartisan” government representatives. Democratic Presidents Roosevelt and Truman upheld this commitment to
impartiality, generally drawing neutral Board appointees from
government and academia; Eisenhower, however, the first Republican to take office since the NLRA was enacted, set a dangerous precedent when he began appointing management-side

35. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2012).
36. Id. § 153(b).
37. Id. § 153(d).
38. Id. § 160(e)‒(f).
39. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 74TH CONG., COMPARISON
OF S. 2926 (73D CONG.) AND S. 1958 (74TH CONG.) (Comm. Print 1935), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, at
1319, 1320 (1949).
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40

attorneys to the Board. Subsequent Republican presidents followed Eisenhower’s lead by making additional managementside appointments, and Reagan took the approach to a new level by appointing the first decidedly anti-union Board mem41
bers. Although Democratic Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and
Carter had held to the Democratic tradition of appointing neutral Board members, President Clinton finally reacted to Republicans’ pro-management Board-packing strategy by appoint42
ing three pro-union attorneys to the Board. As a result, newly
constituted Boards have made a practice of overruling precedent created by past administrations’ Boards, with each Board
43
instituting its own set of politically-motivated rules. Overpoliticization of the Board has also led to an extremely contentious appointment process, and as has been observed, exercise
of the ‘nuclear’ option.
I. THE FLIP-FLOP PROBLEM
Over the years, the Board’s practice of flip-flopping its positions on important industrial relations issues with each
change in the White House has bred confusion, uncertainty,
and operational inefficiencies for employers as they attempt to
comply with standards, perhaps better characterized as ‘moving targets.’ The NLRB’s unbridled politicization and frequent
policy shifts have eroded employer and union confidence in the
Board as a capable and stable agency, as well as lawmakers,
44
the public, academics, and the popular press. Federal courts,
too, have expressed frustration with the Board’s constant policy
40. See Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB, 1935–2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1454–55 (2000)
(documenting backgrounds of Board members appointed from 1935 to 1998).
41. See id. at 1384–85.
42. See id. at 1394–95, 1455. Clinton was also the first Democratic president to appoint management-side lawyers, choosing three to fill the Republican seats on the Board. Id. at 1394.
43. See Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems With Its Structure and Function and Suggestions
for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2020 (2009). See generally Samuel Estreicher,
Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L.
REV. 163 (1985).
44. See, e.g., STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM,
112TH CONG., PRESIDENT OBAMA’S PRO-UNION BOARD: THE NLRB’S METAMORPHOSIS FROM INDEPENDENT REGULATOR TO DYSFUNCTIONAL UNION ADVOCATE 4 (2012) (describing “a pattern of behavior at the NLRB that undermines its integrity and creates an impression that the NLRB has morphed
into a rogue agency plagued by systemic problems”); Estreicher, supra note 43,
at 170–71.
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oscillation and have accordingly afforded Board decisions lim45
ited deference. In 1983, for example, the Seventh Circuit criticized the Board’s “fickleness” in the process of refusing to en46
force an order issued by the Board. During the adjudication
process, the Board changed its position three times on the policy governing misrepresentations made during union election
47
campaigns.
Consecutive Boards have battled over the availability of
card-check recognition for unions, a practice which allows unions to establish recognition based on a showing of authorization cards signed by employees, in lieu of going through a for48
mal NLRB-supervised election process. In 2007, for example,
the Republican-controlled Board struck down past precedent in
order to institute a policy making it easier to decertify unions
established by the card-check process than those certified by

45. See Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of “Hiding the Ball”: NLRB
Policymaking and the Failure of Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REV. 387, 418–20
(1995) (noting that federal courts frequently reverse questionable NLRB decisions without remanding them back to the Board for further consideration).
46. Mosey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB., 701 F.2d 610, 612 (7th Cir. 1983).
47. Id. Two months before the election in Mosey, the Board held in Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977), that it would no longer
try to protect workers from misrepresentations made by either management or
unions in election campaigns, as it had done in the fifteen years following Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962). In April 1978 the Board applied to the Seventh Circuit for enforcement of its order against Mosey. Shortly before oral argument, the Board decided General Knit of California, Inc.,
239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978), in which it overruled Shopping Kart and reinstated
Hollywood Ceramics, but without saying whether it meant the new rule to apply to pending cases. Although the Board's counsel in Mosey urged the Seventh Circuit to apply Hollywood Ceramics, the Seventh Circuit remanded the
case to the Board and "express[ed] no view on the merits of any objection to
the election." NLRB v. Mosey Mfg. Co., 595 F.2d 375, 375, n.2 (7th Cir. 1979).
On remand, the administrative law judge found that the union had made a
material misrepresentation which in light of a close vote made the election invalid. Mosey Mfg. Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 908 (1979). The Board reversed; it found
there had been no misrepresentation and in any event it had not been material. Mosey Mfg. Co., 255 N.L.R.B. 552 (1981). The Board reinstated a bargaining order and again applied to the Seventh Circuit for enforcement. Id. After
oral argument, but before the Seventh Circuit panel handed down a decision,
the Board decided Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982), which
overruled General Knit and reinstated Shopping Kart.
48. See Fisk & Malamud, supra note 43, at 2021. For a general discussion
of card-check authorization, see James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and
Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV.
819, 824–40 (2005); Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655, 668–
72 (2010).
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NLRB-supervised elections. Less than five years later, the decision was reversed by the Board under the Obama administra50
tion.
NLRA Section 7 protects employees’ rights to support or refrain from supporting unions and to engage in protected con51
certed activity. Protection of “concerted activity” generally extends to communications relating to terms and conditions of
employment, arising in connected with activity by two or more
52
employees or in a representative activity.
The Board’s position on which activities and actors should
be protected under Section 7 of the NLRA has also vacillated
over time. One of the most significant battles has centered
around the definition of the word “employee” for the purpose of
determining which classes of workers may seek protection under the NLRA. The Board has issued confusing and contradictory decisions, for example, on which kinds of workers might
fall into the category of supervisor, temporary employee, or independent contractor, and thus be denied the right to unionize
or engage in collective bargaining activity protected by the
53
Act.
The Board has also flip-flopped in its interpretation of
what kinds of activities constitute “other concerted activities
54
for . . .mutual aid or protection” under Section 7 of the Act.
While Republican-controlled Boards have interpreted this protection narrowly, Democratic Boards have applied the protec55
tion to a broad range of non-union-related employee activism.
Another particularly egregious example concerns the Board’s
position on whether Section 7 of the NLRA grants a non-union
employee the right to have a co-worker representative present
during investigatory issues. The Board answered yes to this
56
57
58
question in 1982, no in 1985, yes again in 2000, and no
59
again in 2004.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007).
Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (Aug. 26, 2011).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
Id.; Compuware Corp. v. NLRB, 134 F.3d 1285 (1998).
See Fisk & Malamud, supra note 43, at 2027 n.68.
29 U.S.C. § 157.
See Fisk & Malamud, supra note 43, at 2024.
Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1010 (1982).
Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230, 230 (1985).
Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B. 676, 678 (2000).
IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1288 (2004).
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In one prominent example, the Board’s practice of flipflopping on an important issue under the Act has spanned half
a century. In 1962, the Board concluded in the landmark Bethlehem Steel Company decision that employers could lawfully
cancel a contractual dues checkoff arrangement when a collec60
tive bargaining agreement expires. This decision was reaf61
62
firmed 20 years later in 1982, and again in 2000. In the latter case, the Board cited numerous decisions relying on
Bethlehem Steel during the intervening 38 years. The Board
again reached the same decision in 2007, relying in that case on
63
the specific language of the agreement at issue. However, the
Board started to flip in 2010, when it deadlocked on this issue
in a 2-2 vote, with one member having been recused from the
64
case. Then in 2012—exactly 50 years after Bethlehem Steel—
the Board overruled that decision and held that employers cannot unilaterally cancel dues checkoff upon expiration of a col65
lective bargaining agreement.
The flip-flopping process at the Board frequently involves
the agency’s most fundamental policy determinations. For example, in the highly controversial Specialty Healthcare & Re66
habilitation Center decision, the Board radically changed its
historical “community of interest” standard for determining the
scope of appropriate bargaining units.
Fundamentally, the NLRA does not require a petitioning
union to propose the most appropriate unit for purposes of bargaining. Rather, the Act merely requires a union to petition for
67
“an” appropriate unit. In determining whether a petitioned-for
unit is “an” appropriate unit, the Board developed its community of interest standard, under which, in general, employees in a
broad array of job classifications can be deemed appropriate for
inclusion in a single unit as long as they share common terms
and conditions of employment, such as common supervision

60. Bethlehem Steel Company, 136 N.L.R.B. 1500 (1962).
61. Robbins Door & Sash Co., 260 N.L.R.B. 659 (1982).
62. Hacienda Resort Hotel, 331 N.L.R.B. 665 (2000).
63. Hacienda Resort Hotel, 351 N.L.R.B. 504 (2007).
64. Hacienda Resort Hotel, 355 N.L.R.B. 742 (2010).
65. WKYC-TV, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 30 (2012).
66. Specialty Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 83
(2011), enforced 727 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2013).
67. Bartlett Collins Co., 334 N.L.R.B. 484 (2001).
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and management, functional integration, common wages and
68
benefits, and the like.
This standard was clarified in 1980, when the Board explained that its inquiry never addresses, solely and in isolation,
the question whether employees have interests in common with
each other, and it necessarily involves a further determination
whether the interests of the group sought are sufficiently distinct from those of other employees to warrant the establish69
ment of a separate unit. As recently as 2010, this approach to
the community of interest analysis was reaffirmed by the
70
Board. However, one year later, in Specialty Healthcare, the
Board rejected this historical approach, while ostensibly returning to the community of interest standard. The Board held in
that case that if a petitioned-for group shares a community of
interest, the burden is on the party who contends that other
employees must be included in the unit to show they have an
71
overwhelming community of interest with the original group.
This flip-flop by the Board is now ushering in an era of ‘“microunits.’” For example, in one recent case, the Board found appropriate a unit limited to the canine technicians and instructors in a guide dog facility, excluding the various employees
72
who provided other services relating to the guide dogs.
Other examples of radical changes in the law due to shifts
in control of the Board have occurred in the health care industry. In 1974, Congress enacted the Health Care Amendments to
the Act, extending its coverage to nonprofit health care institu73
tions. This was followed by a series of decisions over the next
10 years, in which the Board approved eight bargaining units
in acute care hospitals based upon the traditional “community
74
of interest” standard discussed above. However, in 1984, the
Board adopted a “disparity of interest” standard for these insti75
tutions, leading to a small number of units. But five years lat68. In some industries the Board has gone so far as to identify “presumptively appropriate unit[s],” such as so-called “wall-to-wall” units in retail
stores. Sav-On Drugs, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1962); Haag Drug Co., Inc., 169
N.L.R.B. 877 (1968).
69. Newton-Wellesley Hospital, 250 N.L.R.B. 409 (1980).
70. Wheeling Island Gaming, Inc., 355 N.L.R.B. 637 (2010).
71. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 83, at 1, 11.
72. Guide Dogs for the Blind, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 151 (2013).
73. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(14), 158(d), 158(g) (2012).
74. See an explanation in 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 729–35 (John E.
Higgins, Jr. ed., 6th ed. 2012) and cases cited therein.
75. St. Francis Hosp., 271 N.L.R.B. 948, 954 (1984). See also 1 THE DE-
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er, the Board returned to the eight-unit structure for acute care
hospitals by adopting a rule in an administrative rulemaking
76
proceeding.
The bargaining unit rule adopted by the Board for acute
care hospitals does not apply to non-acute facilities such as
77
nursing homes. In 1991, the Board decided not to rely on either the “community of interest” standard or the “disparity of
78
interest” standard for these facilities. The Board stated that it
would consider not only community of interest factors but also
background information gathered during the acute care rule79
making and prior precedent. However, the Board reversed
course 20 years later, when it overruled the prior precedent for
non-acute health care facilities and ostensibly returned to the
community of interest standard, albeit a radically different ver80
sion of that standard. These “policy” shifts could be readily interpreted as political, based on the composition of the boards in
question and the context in which their decisions were rendered.
It is clear that the process of adjudicating claims brought
under the NLRA must be depoliticized in order to facilitate
fairness and predictability of decision-making. This Article argues that this goal would be best accomplished by eliminating
the NLRB’s adjudicative function in unfair labor practice case
and amending the NLRA to authorize federal district courts to
hear such cases following investigation and conciliation efforts
by the Board. Ceding decision-making power to life-appointed
Article III judges would greatly de-politicize the process, resulting in more reasoned, consistent, and reliable precedent. It
would also eliminate the contentiousness of the Board appointment process and allow the Board to focus on those functions for which it is best suited as a result of its unique agency
expertise—administering representation cases, investigating
and prosecuting unfair labor practices, and resolving claims
that are of questionable merit or otherwise appropriate for early resolution. Increased consistency of decision-making would
VELOPING LABOR LAW 729–35 supra note 74, and cases cited therein for further discussion.
76. 29 C.F.R § 103.30 (2012). The Supreme Court approved the rule in
Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 608–09 (1991).
77. 29 C.F.R § 103.30.
78. See Park Manor Care Ctr., Inc., 305 N.L.R.B. 872, 875 (1991).
79. Id.
80. Specialty Healthcare & Rehabilitation Ctr., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 83, at 16
(2011).
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also be expected to result in less litigation, as the temptation to
bring cases in hopes of inciting the latest policy reversal will be
lessened. Further, allowing litigants to bring their cases directly to federal district courts will increase expediency of decisionmaking, which will lead to more effective vindication of Section
7 rights as well as a stronger deterrent to unfair labor practices
by both employers and unions.
Part III below will lay out a new plan for labor law reform
and address the anticipated effects and potential limitations of
the proposal.
II. ELIMINATING THE NLRB AS ADJUDICATOR: A NEW
PLAN FOR LABOR LAW REFORM AND ANTICIPATED
EFFECTS/LIMITATIONS OF THE PLAN
A. THE PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
The primary change suggested by this proposal is the revision of Section 10 of the Act and related procedural regulations
to eliminate the Board’s authority to adjudicate unfair labor
practice cases and transfer that responsibility to the federal
district courts. This approach generally follows the procedural
structure of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as adapted to the
Board’s existing organizational structure.
Under the proposal, the Board’s regional directors, acting
on behalf of the agency’s General Counsel, would continue to
investigate unfair labor practice charges and determine whether they have merit. If no merit is found, a charge would be dismissed. However, if the regional director finds merit in a
charge, an attempt would be made to reach a settlement
through conciliation between the respondent (employer or union) and the charging party. If a settlement is not reached, the
charging party could file a complaint in an appropriate federal
district court based upon the allegations in the charge. In the
alternative, the General Counsel, on behalf of the Board, could
file such a complaint. A decision of the district court could be
81
appealed by the losing party to the federal courts of appeals.
These procedures would follow the same general approach es82
tablished by Section 706 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

81. Alternatively, to extinguish forum shopping, one federal appellate
court, e.g., the D.C. Circuit, could be designated as the “labor” court of appeals.
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5 (2012) (describing the enforcement provisions
of the Civil Rights Act).
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If a district court finds that a respondent (employer or union) has violated the Act, it could impose the same cease-anddesist and affirmative action remedies under this plan that are
83
now available to the Board under Section 10(c) of the Act. Although that section provides for a remedy of reinstatement and
back pay, and it also authorizes certain other monetary remedies in appropriate cases, it does not permit compensatory or
84
punitive damages. Adjustments to add those damages and
provisions relating to fee-shifting should be considered to create
added incentive for traditional labor lawyers to take charges in85
to federal court. While the General Counsel presumably would
require no such incentives in order to initiate federal court litigation over unfair labor practice allegations deemed meritorious, the ability to recover damages and fees on behalf of the
charging party or the government would similarly aid the
Board in fulfilling its function of vindicating Section 7 rights. In
addition, the proposal does not provide for jury trials or class
actions, which are not available under the Act.
As a result of the changes outlined above, regional directors would no longer issue a complaint against a respondent
when a determination is made that a charge has merit. Furthermore, administrative law judges would no longer hold hearings on unfair labor practice complaints or issue recommended
decisions for review by the Board. The function of administrative law judges would be eliminated.
There would be no change, however, in the Board’s responsibility for processing representation cases under Section 8 of
the Act. Regional directors, acting on behalf of the Board,
would continue to conduct representation hearings; determine
the scope of appropriate units; rule on the eligibility of voters;
86
conduct secret ballot elections; rule on election objections and

83. See Anne Marie Lofaso, The Persistence of Union Repression in an Era
of Recognition, 62 ME. L. REV. 199, 221–22 (2010) (discussing the Board’s authority under 10(c)).
84. See id.
85. New remedies could be added to cases involving representational issues that would promote compliance by unions and employers. For example, if
an employer violates the Act, the employer would be subject to card checks.
And if a union violates the Act, it would be barred from organizing that employer for two years.
86. One paradigm change that would make the proposal more attractive
to organized labor is to establish a baseline rule that if a union presents authorization cards signed by a majority of employees it seeks to represent, an
employer can demand a secret ballot election in forty-two days, provided the
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challenges to voter eligibility; and certify the results of elections. As in the past, the losing party could file a request for review of a regional director’s decision with the Board, and the
Board would decide whether to reverse or modify the regional
director’s decision.
In addition, the regional director, on behalf of the Board,
would continue to resolve other representation issues that do
not involve the election of a representative. For example, the
regional director would hear and resolve petitions to clarify a
bargaining unit; petitions to amend a certification; and petitions for an election to “deauthorize” a union security provision
in a collective bargaining agreement that imposes a requirement of mandatory union membership. And the Board would
continue to rule on requests for review of such decisions.
In one change from the past, an employer would no longer
be required to commit a “technical” refusal to bargain in order
to obtain judicial review of the Board’s decision in a representation case. This procedural anomaly would be eliminated by
providing a right to appeal such a decision to an appropriate
federal court of appeals. The appeal would be expedited so as
not to deprive employees of the benefits of collective bargaining
if the appeal is denied. The duty to bargain would commence if
and when the appellate court dismisses the appeal and orders
bargaining. Without this change, under current procedures, the
parties are required to go through the motions of a pro forma
charge proceeding to find the employer guilty of a “technical”
unfair labor practice before appellate review of the decision is
permitted—thus burdening the court’s docket and causing
87
needless expense for both the employer and the union. Furthermore, the employer appeals at its peril because the duty to
bargain would be retroactive, a result that is contrary to the
88
principle of due process of law.
For example, if a regional director, relying on the Specialty
Healthcare decision discussed above, approves a micro-unit requested by a petitioning union in a representation case—such
as the ladies shoe department in a department store—and the
Board certifies the union as bargaining representative following an election in that unit, the employer could file an appeal
employer allows equal workplace access. If an employer refuses to allow union
access, elections would then be directed in two weeks.
87. See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2012) (delineating the procedure for appellate review).
88. See id. § 158 (discussing retroactive application of Board decisions).
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directly with the circuit court of appeals to challenge the
Board’s decision. Similarly, if the Board sets aside an employer’s victory in a representation election because of a wage increase granted during the pre-election campaign, and the union
wins a second election and is certified by the Board, the employer could file an appeal from that decision directly with the
court of appeals.
One other procedural change would be required to transfer
the adjudication of unfair labor practice charges to the federal
district courts. Under current procedure, a party losing a representation election can file both election objections and unfair
89
labor practice charges based upon the same conduct. The objections and charges are then consolidated for decision by an
90
administrative law judge. This procedural approach would no
longer be workable because the district court, instead of the
Board, would rule on unfair labor practice charges, while the
Board would rule on election objections. From the standpoint of
the representation case, however, this change would have no
legal impact because a finding of objectionable conduct affecting the outcome of an election is sufficient to set aside the election and order that a new one be conducted.
In recognition of this procedural overlap, federal judges
would stay any action on unfair labor practice allegations in a
complaint based on the same conduct as election objections under review by the Board, until the Board finally resolves the
matter. At that point, the court would dismiss the allegations
unless the interests of justice require continued litigation after
the Board’s decision. In addition, the court would stay action on
such allegations if review of the Board’s representation decision
has been sought in the court of appeals.
Under current procedure, a union can file “blocking charg91
es” to prevent a representation election from being conducted.
This typically occurs in the case of a petition by employees for a
decertification election, or an “RM” election petition filed by an
employer when a union has sought recognition but declines to
92
file a petition for an election. Regional directors have wide
89. See 22 FED. PROC., L. ED. § 52:659 (discussing representation proceedings).
90. Id.
91. See Sarah Pawlicki, Levitz Furniture Co.: The End of Celanese and the
Good-Faith Doubt Standard for Withdrawing Recognition of Incumbent Unions, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 381, 382 & n.11 (2003) (discussing blocking charges).
92. Id.
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discretion in allowing elections to be blocked, and this sometimes results in the delay of an election for months and in some
cases for years—especially when the union resorts to the tactic
of filing consecutive unmeritorious charges over a long period of
93
time. This is contrary to the central policy of the Act, which is
to allow employees to freely choose their bargaining representative, or to choose not to be represented at all.
To effectuate this important policy, elections could still be
blocked by the incumbent union under the proposal, but for a
maximum period of 14 days regardless of the number of charges filed. Of course, if the conduct leading to a charge is also alleged in election objections, and if the regional director concludes that the conduct was objectionable and affected the
outcome of the election, a new election could be ordered. The
same rules would also apply when a petitioning union files a
charge to block an RC election. In either event, whether the
charges are filed by an incumbent union or a petitioning union,
allegations pending in a lawsuit in federal district court would
not block an election. Otherwise, the district court would be
drawn into the mechanics of the representation proceeding,
94
which would be unworkable.
Union proponents might argue that this limitation on the
blocking charge tactic would result in holding elections without
the requisite laboratory conditions. However, this policy must
coexist with the equally important policy of allowing employees
to vote on whether they want to be represented by the union
involved in the election. It is contrary to this policy to allow a
union to delay for months, and sometimes years, the election
that will provide that opportunity. Furthermore, if the union is
93. A study of cases in 2008 found that the median number of days between the filing of an election petition and the holding of a representation
election when blocking charges were filed was 139 days, as compared to 38
days in unblocked cases. See Samuel Estreicher, Improving the Administration
of the National Labor Relations Act Without Statutory Change, 5 FLA INT’L U.
L. REV. 361, 369 (2010). In some cases, the delay resulting from blocking
charges is much longer than this median number. For example, the delay was
more than three years in Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing Co., 444 F.2d 1064,
1065 (5th Cir. 1971). The delay was more than two years when the appellate
court issued its decision in NLRB v. Anvil Prods., Inc., 496 F.2d 94, 95 (5th
Cir. 1974). And it was 2.5 years when the decision was issued in Bishop v.
NLRB, 502 F.2d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir. 1974).
94. Alternatively, certain representation cases involving peripheral issues
could be managed in arbitration with expedited timelines, and judicial appeal
following thereafter. See infra, Part II.B.2.C (discussing “minor” unfair labor
practice charges).
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unsuccessful in the election, it can be set aside and a new one
held if the Board determines that laboratory conditions did not
exist.
Certain other functions of the Board would remain unaffected by this proposal. For example, the Board is responsible
for resolving jurisdictional disputes by awarding work to one of
two competing unions under Section 10(k) of the Act when a
95
charge has been filed under Section 8(b)(4)(D). In addition,
the Board is required to seek injunctive relief under Section
10(l) of the Act when a union is engaging in an unlawful sec96
ondary boycott under Section 8(b)(4)(B). And the Board has
the power to seek temporary injunctive relief in federal district
court under Section 10(j) of the Act when a complaint has been
97
issued alleging a violation of the Act. All of these functions
would continue as under existing law, with minor conforming
amendments to reflect the changes in the adjudication of
charges outlined above.
Although the Board has interpreted the Act through adjudication of cases in the past, it would not be able to do so in the
future (except for representation cases), because that function
would be transferred to the courts as outlined above. Thus, the
proposal anticipates that the Board may decide to interpret the
law through more frequent rule-making than in the past. However, adopting substantive (legislative) regulations is a very laborious and time-consuming process, and it frequently serves
98
as a lightning rod for challenge in the courts. As an alternative, the proposal authorizes the Board to issue interpretive
guidelines—similar to guidelines issued by the EEOC under Title VII—which do not require notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Although such guidelines do not have the force of law, as in the
case of substantive regulations adopted through the notice-andcomment process, they are entitled to consideration by the
99
courts in construing a statute.
95. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2012).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Scott A. Zebrak, The Future of NLRB Rulemaking: Analyzing the
Mixed Signals Sent by the Implementation of the Health Care Bargaining Unit
Rule and by the Proposed Beck Union Dues Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U.
125, 128–29 (1994) (discussing the difficulties of rule-making).
99. AMTRAK v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110–11 n.6 (2002) (citing EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991)) (EEOC's interpretive guidelines do not receive deference under Chevron U.S. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). Such interpretations are entitled to respect
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B. ANTICIPATED EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSAL
It is anticipated that the proposal outlined above will have
the following effects, which are expressed as advantages and
disadvantages. In addition, the anticipated reactions of labor
and management are noted on key points.
1. Advantages
(a) The decision-making process under the Act should be
less political than in the past because federal district court
judges are likely to be more objective than Board members. The
individuals who are appointed to serve on the Board typically
have represented either labor or management for many years,
and frequently they resume their partisan professional careers
100
upon leaving the Board. Furthermore, this agency has been
invested by Congress with wide discretion to make labor policy
for the nation, as distinguished from strictly interpreting statutory language and making factual determinations, which allows
the latitude to make discretionary decisions reflecting the respective backgrounds of the Board members. Of course, judges
also have biases, which typically reflect the political affiliation
of the president who appoints them. However, judges are more
101
likely to follow the law than their policy preferences. Moreover, district court judges will be required to follow the law as
determined by the appellate judges in their respective circuits—unlike the Board, which typically rejects any precedent
established by an appellate court with which it disagrees, ac102
cepting the court’s decision only as “the law of the case.”
(b) The instability in the law resulting from frequent flipflopping by the Board on key issues under the Act, as described
above, should be sharply curtailed if federal judges are the decision-makers on unfair labor practice issues instead of the
Board. This would seem to necessarily follow from the proposed
change in the existing system, where one agency can, in a sinunder Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (citing Christensen v.
Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)) (but only to the extent that those interpretations have the power to persuade).
100. See Joan Flynn, “Expertness For What?”: The Gould Years at the
NLRB and the Irrepressible Myth of the “Independent” Agency, 52 ADMIN. L.
REV. 465, 474‒77 (2000) (discussing the biases of potential nominees).
101. See, e.g., Erin B. Kaheny, The Nature of Circuit Court Gatekeeping Decisions, 44 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 129, 136 (2010) (discussing circuit courts’ priority of deference to circuit decisions to maintain uniformity in law rather than
expression of policy preferences of circuit court judges).
102. White, supra note 34, at 641–42.
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gle case, change the law for the entire country simply by
achieving a majority of three (or sometimes two) members on
the Board. A federal district court judge would not have the
same nation-wide jurisdiction, and he or she would be controlled by the precedent in that particular circuit. Under the
current system, the Board has no similar requirement to acquiesce in the precedent of a circuit; and in some cases, the Board
appears repeatedly before the same circuit in defense of the
same position on an issue, knowing that it will lose the case,
but nevertheless “respectfully disagreeing” with the court of
appeals.
(c) As the Board becomes less politicized, the process of appointing and confirming Board members should also become
less political. This would reduce the likelihood that the Board
will lose a quorum because of filibusters in the Senate. Twice in
recent years the Board has been besieged by challenges to its
ability to function as an agency of the federal government. In
103
the first case, New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, the Board
had attempted to function with only two members for a period
of twenty-seven months because of an inability of the President
to make recess appointments due to a filibuster in the Senate.
The Supreme Court held that a quorum of at least three members is required by the Act, and it therefore invalidated roughly
104
six hundred decisions issued by the two-member Board. Cur105
rently, in Noel Canning v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., the Supreme Court is considering whether several recess appointments to the Board were unconstitutional. If so, hundreds of
106
the Board’s decisions over recent years will be invalidated.
And most recently, on November 21, 2013, the Democratic
leadership in the Senate found it necessary to invoke, using a
rare parliamentary move, the “nuclear option”—a change in the
Senate’s filibuster rules—in order to obtain confirmation of a
107
new slate of nominees to the Board. In light of these devel103. New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2639 (2010).
104. See id.
105. Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, 133 S.Ct. 2861 (2013).
106. See New Process Steel, L.P., 130 S. Ct. at 2639.
107. The rules change eliminates the ability of the minority party to hold
up nominations for executive branch and judicial (except Supreme Court) appointments, including NLRB member appointments. Now, only a simple majority of fifty-one votes, instead of the sixty vote supermajority requirements
that has applied for almost forty years, is needed to approve the appointments.
It is debatable whether this legislative “flip flop” will have its intended effect,
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opments, it should be obvious that the Board must be depoliticized if it is to continue to function as a vital federal agency.
When the politicization of the Board results in developments like New Process Steel and Noel Canning, unions and
employers must wait for years to learn the ultimate outcome of
cases that are critical to their interests—not only the parties to
the individual cases but also the larger employer community
and organized labor. It is impossible to calculate the inefficiency cost of this legal quagmire, but it clearly is substantial. For
example, because of the Noel Canning issue, unions and employers do not know whether an employer can lawfully cancel
dues check-off upon the expiration of a collective bargaining
108
agreement; whether an employer must turn over confidential
109
witness statements to a union; whether an employer that loses a union election must bargain with the union over layoffs
and individual disciplinary actions while negotiating an initial
110
collective bargaining agreement; and whether an employer
must bargain over the “effects” of implementing a managerial
decision that is clearly authorized by the management rights
111
clause of an agreement with the union.
Indeed, this uncertainty extends far beyond the unionmanagement context. For example, numerous class and collective action litigants have been waiting for years to learn
whether the Board can prohibit nonunion companies from including a waiver of such actions in a mandatory employment
112
arbitration agreement. And companies must wait for years to
learn whether the Board can intrude on the nonunion workplace to rewrite confidentiality agreements, nondisparagement
policies, and rules requiring employees to be courteous at
113
work; whether an employer can direct employees to hold in
confidence an ongoing investigation of misconduct in the work-

as Republicans have already signaled that when the constitution of the Senate
changes, appointments will move forward (or not) along party lines.
108. WKYC-TV, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 30, at 1 (2012).
109. Piedmont Gardens, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 46, at 1 (2012).
110. Alan Ritchey, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 40, at 1 (2012).
111. Heartland Health Care Ctr.-Plymouth Court, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 155, at
1–2 (2013).
112. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at 1–2 (2012).
113. See, e.g., DirecTV U.S. DirecTV Holdings, LLC, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 54,
at 1 (2013); Flex Frac Logistics, LLC, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 127, at 1 (2012); Costco
Wholesale Corp., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 106, at 1 (2012).
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114

place; and whether employers can fire employees for posting
115
harassing material on social media sites.
(d) In at least some cases, the decision-making process under the Act might take less time in federal court than in the
two-step process at the NLRB, which includes an ALJ proceeding that culminates in a recommended decision, followed by an
appeal (known as “exceptions”) filed at the Board by the losing
party. Of course, litigation in federal court can also be ponderous and time-consuming, given the opportunity for extensive
discovery, complex procedural requirements, and crowded district court dockets. However, some cases languish at the Board
for several years before a decision is issued, and this should occur with less frequency, if at all, when the cases are under the
control of a federal judge.
(e) Until the Supreme Court resolves an issue under the
Act, the Board does not consider itself bound by appellate court
116
rulings, except as the law of the case. It appears that the
Board might continue to follow this controversial practice of
non-acquiescence, even under the structure recommended in
the proposal. However, the district courts, which would make
the decisions in unfair labor practice cases, would be obligated
to follow the law in their respective circuits. This should increase respect for the judiciary and the rule of law. In addition,
it would result in a more stable body of case law to serve as
precedent to guide employers and unions in the future.
(f) When the Board now seeks temporary injunctive relief
in federal district court under Section 10(j) of the Act, the bar
117
for granting such relief is quite low. The court can grant any
118
relief that “it deems just and proper.” This can place the respondent (employer or union) at an unfair disadvantage in subsequently litigating the same issue before an ALJ and the
Board, because the court has already ruled on key issues in deciding whether to grant the request for temporary relief. In effect, the decision is issued and relief granted by the judge on a
temporary showing before the case is fully litigated before the
ALJ and the Board. Under the proposal, the Section 10(j) proceeding would be consolidated with the litigation in the same

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Banner Estrella Med. Ctr., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 93, at 2 (2012).
Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 1–2 (2012).
White, supra note 34, at 644.
See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2012).
Id.
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court over the allegations in the charge, thus eliminating, to a
certain extent, this unfair procedure.
(g) Currently a party that is aggrieved by a final order of
the Board in an unfair labor practice case is able to engage in a
limited amount of appellate forum-shopping when it seeks re119
view of an NLRB decision on the charges. Section 10(f) of the
Act provides that the party may obtain a review of such order
in any federal court of appeals in the circuit where the unfair
labor practice was alleged to have occurred; or where the party
resides or transacts business; or in the District of Columbia
120
Circuit. This option would no longer be available under the
proposal because appellate review of unfair labor practice decisions would occur in the circuit in which the district court making the decision is located. Some may consider this change an
improvement from a policy standpoint. It would likely be considered a negative change by employers, however, as it would
narrow their review options. And unions might also be opposed
to it if they are focused on the cases that might arise in which
they are the respondent.
(h) Interpreting the law through the adoption of interpretive guidelines by the Board, instead of the case-by-case adjudication of unfair labor practice charges by that agency, could
prove to be a more efficient and orderly process, potentially
leading to better results from a policy standpoint. However,
this would not preclude flip-flopping by the Board to effectuate
policy changes in the guidelines when there is a change in control of the Board. In addition, employers would likely view even
121
this informal type of rulemaking as a negative change. Re122
cent experience with the Board’s notice-posting rule, and es119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See infra Part II.C (discussing whether the NLRB should be limited to
promulgating interpretive and procedural rules and policy statements, as the
EEOC is under Title VII).
122. Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations
Act, Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,008 (Aug. 30, 2011) (codified at 29
C.F.R. § 104). Soon after the final rule was issued, two district court cases
were filed challenging its validity. In Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 856 F.
Supp. 2d 778, 780 (D.S.C. 2012), aff’d, 721 F.3d 152 (4th Cir. 2013), a South
Carolina district court determined that the Board lacked the authority to
promulgate the rule. The Fourth Circuit later affirmed the decision. Chamber
of Commerce v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152 (4th Cir. 2013). Soon after, the D.C. circuit enjoined implementation of the rule. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, No. 125068, 2012 WL 4328371, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 17, 2012) (order granting temporary injunction). A subsequent D.C. Circuit ruling vacated the rule for invalid
enforcement provisions. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947, 963–64
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123

pecially the so-called, “quickie” election rule —known by some
as the “ambush” election rule—have taught employers that a
Board determined to change policy will find a way to do so.
Limiting the Board to enforcing the NLRA through interpretative guidance, rather than binding legislative rules, will guard
against the unproductive flip-flopping this Article has highlighted as a reason for change.
(i) The proposal would provide an orderly procedure for appealing representation case decisions of the Board to the appellate courts, which would be far more efficient and cost-effective
than pro forma litigation over “technical” refusals to bargain.
In addition, employers would no longer need to be in the position of intentionally refusing to bargain in order to appeal a decision they believe to be incorrect, nor would they be subject to
retroactive penalties for actions taken without bargaining during the period of appellate review. These are compelling arguments from a due process standpoint. Even though the proposal
includes an expedited appeal process, unions still may view this
procedural modification as a negative, as they are unlikely to
welcome the elimination of penalties in a process that will,
even if reduced, continue to create delay.
(j) Union reliance on blocking charges should be reduced by
the proposal, thus promoting the core policy of the Act that employees should have a free choice in making decisions on questions of union representation. However, unions would likely
view this as a negative change because it would deprive them of
a tactical weapon in fending off challenges to their representative status.
2. Disadvantages
(a) The litigation of unfair labor practice cases likely would
be more expensive in some cases than under the current system
for the charging party (usually a union or individual) because of
(D.C. Cir. 2013). As a result of this litigation, the rule has yet to be implemented in any form.
123. Representation—Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 80,138 (Dec. 22, 2011)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 101–02). The rule was ultimately struck down
by a D.C. Circuit court for failure to meet quorum requirements in promulgating the rule. Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 879 F. Supp. 2d 18, 30 (D.D.C.
2012). This led the NLRB to suspend its enforcement. See Press Release,
NLRB, NLRB Suspends Implementation of Representation Case Amendments
Based on Court Ruling (May 15, 2012), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news
-outreach/news-story/nlrb-suspends-implementation-representation-case
-amendments-based-court.
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a need to retain counsel to file an action in federal court. Currently the General Counsel prosecutes unfair labor practice
charges in proceedings before an ALJ and the Board after issu124
ing a complaint. The charging party can be represented by
separate counsel in such proceedings, but this is not neces125
sary. Under the proposal, the General Counsel could file an
action in court, but it would not be required to do so. Thus, in
at least some cases, the charging party would need to obtain
counsel. Unions are likely to view this as a negative change.
(b) Litigation in court over unfair labor practice allegations
would probably be more expensive for both parties than NLRB
proceedings, and there could still be considerable delay. Such
litigation includes extensive discovery requirements, personal
appearances in court by counsel to argue motions, and greater
procedural formality than exists under NLRB procedures. Savvy labor lawyers from the ranks of either management or organized labor may be postured, under our model, to “game” court
review for extended periods of time. These problems, however,
could be mitigated somewhat by special local rules or judge’s
standing orders prescribing more streamlined and less burdensome procedures for unfair labor practice cases.
(c) Many unfair labor practice complaints issued under the
Act involve matters of relatively minor significance, especially
in monetary terms. Parties often litigate before the Board over
such nonmonetary issues as posting a notice stating that an
employer will avoid allegedly unlawful conduct in the future. At
issue can be such questions as the precise wording on the notice, how broadly it must be disseminated, and whether a company executive must read it aloud in a meeting of employees.
Given the anticipated costs associated with litigation in the
courts, it is likely that at least some cases of this type would
not be filed under the proposal if the General Counsel is unwilling or unavailable to file an action in court to enforce the remedy. Unions are likely to view this possibility as a negative
change.
(d) The Board’s General Counsel currently attains a high
settlement rate in unfair labor practice cases. For example, in
the most recent report on this subject, the General Counsel
stated that the settlement rate had been 91 percent for merito126
rious cases during fiscal year 2012. Given the increased cost
124. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.8, 101.10 (2013).
125. Id.
126. See Memorandum from Lafe Solomon, Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to all
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of litigation for charging parties, employers might be less inclined to settle some cases, anticipating that an action would
not be filed in court.
(e) This proposal already relegates the more technical aspects of NLRA administration to the Board, in recognition of
the fact that the Board’s administrative law judges, staff attorneys and its General Counsel develop a high level of expertise
under the Act, as do the Board members themselves. However,
it may still be argued that federal judges would be faced with a
steep learning curve under the proposal, and they would seldom acquire the same level of expertise under the Act as personnel at the Board.While this may be offset by other considerations, for example, the federal judiciary being uniquely suited
to assume the adjudicative responsibilities outlined in this proposal, to a certain extent it might be considered a negative factor.
(f) The bifurcation of the litigation process in election cases
between representation and unfair labor practice issues under
the proposal is likely to be a less efficient approach than the
current system of consolidating the issues in one case before an
ALJ. But there does not appear to be any alternative as it
would not be feasible for federal judges to conduct union representation elections, or to make the numerous legal decisions
that are currently made by the Board and its regional directors
in connection with such elections.
(g) Although the proposal contemplates the adoption of interpretive guidelines like those adopted by the EEOC under Title VII, instead of substantive (legislative) regulations, employers are likely to view this or any other form of increased
rulemaking as harmful to their interests. Furthermore, although the proposal contemplates that the guidelines would be
entitled to some deference by federal judges but would not be
binding, the Board has broad rulemaking authority under the
Act, and it could resort instead to the adoption of substantive
regulations. This would require a higher degree of deference by
the federal courts than is contemplated by the proposal.
(h) The shift in adjudication authority to district courts
would also affect the caseloads of those courts, which already
have high numbers of matters on their dockets, as well as many
vacant positions. While courts might, then, be initially hesitant
with this realignment, some of the concerns about backlog
employees, Summary of Operations for the Fiscal Year 2012, at 4 (Jan. 8,
2013), available at http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/r?Open=ldue-93utkr.
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might be ameliorated with, e.g., some form of specialized federal labor law bench comparable to the structure already in place
for bankruptcy matters.
C. LIMITING THE NLRB TO PROMULGATING INTERPRETIVE AND
PROCEDURAL RULES AND POLICY STATEMENTS, MIRRORING THE
EEOC’S ROLE UNDER TITLE VII
To move away from a rulemaking model that replicates
binding flip-flopping and politically-based outcomes, we propose
Board rule-making authority in the form of administrative
guidelines, similar to those adopted by the EEOC, instead of
legislative (binding) rules. As with guidance from other administrative agencies, Board guidance would be subject to some
deference by the federal courts, given the Board’s labor relations subject matter expertise. Ultimately, however, courts
would be free to rule outside Board guidelines, applying what
over time would become a new (and, we submit, more stable)
body of judicial labor law precedent.
1. Rulemaking Under Federal Law Generally.
Federal administrative agency rulemaking can a play a
significant role within the United States government’s establishment of federal law. The basic rulemaking framework for
federal agency rulemaking was established under the Adminis127
trative Procedure Act of 1946 (“APA” or “Act”). Under the
APA, a federal “rule” is, “the whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements
128
of an agency.”
Implementing rules add no substance to legislative direction that has been fully developed; rules interpreting and clarifying statutory ambiguities, and prescriptive rules (also referred to as “legislative” rules) establish substantive law where

127. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706, 1305, 3105, 5372, 7521
(2012) (establishing a rule making framework).
128. Id. § 551(4); see CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 2–3
(4th ed. 2011) (“[A] rule is the skin of a living policy . . . it hardens an inchoate
normative judgment into the frozen form of words . . . . Its issuance marks the
transformation of policy from the private wish to public expectation . . . . [T]he
framing of a rule is the climactic act of the policy making process.” (quoting U.
of Penn. Law School Dean Colin Diver, paraphrasing Oliver Wendell Holmes)).
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Congress has provided little detail about how law and policy ob129
jectives are achieved.
130
The APA establishes “formal rulemaking” (seldom used)
131
processes and “informal rulemaking” processes.
Informal
rulemaking is commonly characterized as “notice-andcomment” rulemaking and requires each agency to satisfy basic
procedural steps: (1) publication of notice of proposed rulemaking; (2) public participation via submission of written comments; and (3) at least 30 days prior to a rule’s effective date,
final rule publication supported by a statement of basis and
132
purpose. No public hearings are required for notice and com133
ment rulemaking.
Rules regarding agency organization, procedure and practice, agency personnel manuals, interpretive rules, and general
policy statements are subject to publication requirements, but
134
are exempt from the other APA requirements. They are valid
135
upon Federal Register publication.
The outcome of notice and comment rulemaking satisfying
all APA requirements is the creation of legislative or substan136
tive rules having “the force or effect of law.” That is, they are
binding on the government and private parties until judicially
137
overturned or the agency rescinds them. In contrast, while
courts’ interpretation of federal law generally accords some
weight to an agency’s views as expressed in interpretive
138
rules, interpretive rules, advisory in nature, have no binding
129. KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 128, at 5–6, 22.
130. Formal rulemaking is mandatory when a non-APA statute provides a
rule must be “made on the record after opportunity for agency hearing.” 5
U.S.C. § 553(c). Formal rulemaking procedures are rarely used except in certain “rate-making, agriculture marketing order and food additive proceedings.” JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 5 (5th
ed. 2012).
131. Am. Bar Ass’n, A Blackletter Statement of Federal Administrative
Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 30–36 (2002).
132. Id. (summarizing notice and comment rulemaking).
133. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (providing interested persons an opportunity
to participate, but no requirement for an oral hearing).
134. Id. § 553(b)(A); see also Claire Tuck, Note, Policy Formulation at the
NLRB: A Viable Alternative to Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 27 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1117, 1146 (2005).
135. 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (2012) (stating that publication in the Federal Register creates a presumption of validity).
136. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979).
137. ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PROCESS: IN A NUTSHELL 315–16 (3d ed. 1990).
138. Id. at 317.
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139

effect and are not entitled to deference if inconsistent with
statutory intent. In contrast, they may be developed “in any
140
way an agency sees fit.”
2. Current NLRB Rules Are Mainly Procedural, Not
Substantive
141

While the Board has rulemaking NLRA authority, the
Board may exercise its discretion in deciding whether to exercise that authority or to establish national labor policy via ad142
judication.
Nevertheless, NLRB rules found at 29 C.F.R.
143
§§ 101-104 are mainly procedural, not substantive. Part 101
(“Statements of Procedure”) and 102 (“Rules and Regulations”)
establish procedures relating to investigation and prosecution
of unfair labor practice charges and compliance with NLRB orders as well as the conduct of questions concerning representa144
tion, including union elections. Part 103 does contain some
limited substantive rules: Subpart A sets forth jurisdictional
standards covering colleges and universities, symphony orchestras and the horseracing and dog-racing industries, and Subpart C establishes rules governing appropriate bargaining
145
units in the healthcare industry.
Promulgation of the
healthcare bargaining unit rules in 1989 was the first and only
successful exercise by the NLRB of its rulemaking authority in
any material way to establish substantive law.
In contrast, NLRB rulemaking initiatives following promulgation of the healthcare regulations have failed. In 1992, the
Board attempted, unsuccessfully, to memorialize via rulemaking the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Communications

139. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236–37 (1974).
140. KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 128, at 22–23 (“[I]nterpretive rules
may stretch law or rules . . . [but] do not impose new legal obligations . . . .”
(citing as example Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s “Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection”)).
141. See 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2012) (stating that the NLRB has authority to
"make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by the [APA], such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out” the provisions of the NLRA);
Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 609 (1991) (upholding NLRB’s
healthcare unit rule); id. at 610 (describing how Section 6 of the NLRA is “unquestionably sufficient to authorize the rule at issue in this case”).
142. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974).
143. Section 104’s effective date has been delayed indefinitely. See 29
C.F.R. § 104 (2013).
144. Id. §§ 101, 102.
145. Id.
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146

Workers of America v. Beck establishing unions’ obligations to
notify members of their financial and membership obligations
147
under labor agreements with union security clauses. Likewise, rulemaking efforts to capture NLRB precedent establish148
ing a presumption in favor of single location units also failed.
Both proposed rules crumbled under the weight of strong oppo149
sition from interested groups. Unions opposed the higher notice and disclosure requirements imposed by the Beck holding
and, by putting intense political pressure on the Board, were
150
able to discourage the NLRB from promulgating a final rule.
The second rulemaking attempt, which would have classified
single locations of multi-location entities as independent bargaining units, was opposed by employers and conservative
members of Congress, who believed that the rule would unfairly favor unions by making formation of bargaining units easi151
er. Congress successfully killed the proposed rule by attaching a rider to the NLRB budget appropriation bills in 1996,
1997, and 1998 prohibiting the Board from spending any of its
152
budgets on promulgating the rule.
The NLRB’s recent attempts at rulemaking on both procedural and substantive issues have also failed primarily because
of ongoing challenges relating to Board action without a quorum. On May 14, 2012, so-called “quickie election rules” were
struck down by the District Court for the D.C. Circuit because
the Board lacked a quorum when it voted to adopt the rule, and
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit subsequently
dismissed the Board’s appeal of that decision pursuant to a

146. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
147. See Union Dues Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 43,635, 43,637 (1992). The
proposed rule was withdrawn four years later in favor of case-by-case adjudication. See Rules and Procedures for the Implementation of Communications
Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); 61 Fed. Reg. 11,167 (Mar. 19, 1996)
(codified at 29 C.F.R. pt 102).
148. See Appropriateness of Requested Single Location Bargaining Units in
Representation Cases, 60 Fed. Reg. 50,146 (Sept. 28, 1995). The proposal was
ultimately withdrawn in 1998. See Rules Regarding Standardized Remedial
Provisions in Board Unfair Labor Practice Decisions and the Appropriateness
of Single Location Bargaining Units in Representation Cases, 63 Fed. Reg.
8890, 8891 (Feb. 23, 1998) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 102).
149. See Tuck, supra note 134, at 1135–40 (describing political opposition
to the NLRB’s substantive rulemaking efforts).
150. See id. at 1139.
151. See id. at 1136.
152. See Flynn, supra note 100, at 501–02 n.152.
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153

joint stipulation of the parties. In February, 2014, the Board
republished the election rules, which seems certain to lead to a
new round of litigation over the coming years. Additionally, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck the Board’s
NLRA employee rights notice rule on May 7, 2013, finding that
154
it violated Sections 8(b) and 8(c) of the Act. The notice rule
was later also rejected by the Court of Appeals for the fourth
Circuit on lack of quorum and other grounds in Chamber of
Commerce of the United States v. NLRB. The court stated that
“[t]here is no general grant of power to the NLRB outside the
roles of addressing [unfair labor practice] charges and conducting representation elections. . . . Indeed, there is no function or
responsibility of the Board not predicated upon the filing of an
155
unfair labor practice charge or a representation petition.”
Beyond formal rulemaking, every year, the Board’s General Counsel issues numerous enforcement guidance memoranda that, while not constituting broad policy guidance, provide
notice of the enforcement position the GC will take under the
156
NLRA. Finally, in some areas the NLRB has been prolific in
the issuance of procedural interpretive rules and directives and
157
bargaining unit summary guidance.
153. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. NLRB, 879 F. Supp. 2d 18, 28–29
(D.D.C. 2012).
154. National Ass'n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
155. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152,
154, 160 (4th Cir. 2013). In spite of these losses, on August 30, 3013, the
NLRB launched a mobile app for iPhones and Androids providing, “employers,
employees and unions with information regarding their rights and obligations
under the National Labor Relations Act.” National Labor Relations Board
Launches Mobile App, NLRB OFF. PUB. AFF. (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.nlrb
.gov/news-outreach/news-story/national-labor-relations-board-launches-mobile
-app (last viewed Apr. 1, 2014).
156. See, e.g., General Counsel Memos, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/reports
-guidance/general-counsel-memos (last visited Feb. 6, 2014) (providing links to
all general counsel memos).
157. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board, An Outline of Law and Procedure in Representation Cases (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/
sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-1727/representation_case_
outline_of_law_4-16-13.pdf (providing Agency staff and labor-management
community with representation case issues); National Labor Relations Board
Casehandling Manual, Part One, Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings (Dec.
2011), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic
-page/node-1727/Final%20ULP%202013%20_1.pdf (providing procedural and
operational guidance for the Agency’s Regional Directors and their staffs when
making decisions as to unfair labor practice and representation matters under
the National Labor Relations Act); National Labor Relations Board
Casehandling Manual, Part Three, Compliance Proceedings (Nov. 2013),
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/
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3. Rulemaking Under Title VII.
Congress did not grant authority to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) when Title VII was enacted
to write legislative rules. Under Title VII, the EEOC is only authorized to, “issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural regu158
lations to carry out” Title VII’s requirements.
Thus, the
Commission has promulgated “Procedural Regulations” as set
out in 29 C.F.R. Part 1601 while, in contrast, its’ remaining Title VII regulations encompass non-binding advisory standards
159
formulated as “Guidelines” that lack the force of law but are
160
entitled to deference.
4. Limiting NLRB Rulemaking Authority to Procedural and
Non-Binding Interpretive Rules
NLRB adjudicatory rulemaking has been the subject of
161
strong Supreme Court criticism at times. The Supreme Court
node-1727/CHMIII-2013.pdf (providing procedural and operational guidance
for compliance proceedings); National Labor Relations Board Casehandling
Manual, Part Two Representation Proceedings (Aug. 2007), available at http://
www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-1727/chm2.pdf
(providing procedural and operational guidance to Agent’s in representation
proceedings); National Labor Relations Board Section 10(j) Manual (redacted)
(Sept. 2002), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/
basic-page/node-1727/redacted_10j_manual_5.0_reduced.pdf) (providing procedural and operational guidance for Agent’s for processing Section 10(j) cases); Office of the General Counsel, NLRB, Guide for Hearing Officers in NLRB
Representation and Section 10(K) Proceedings (Sept. 2003), available at http://
www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-1727/hearing_
officers_guide.pdf (providing hearing officers with instruction on conducting
postelection hearings).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2012). In contrast, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Americans with Disabilities Act, the Commission
has authority to make legislative rules. See 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2012) (ADEA)
(“[T]he [EEOC] may issue such rules and regulations as it may consider necessary or appropriate . . . .”).
159. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604 (2010) (describing EEOC Guidelines on
Discrimination because of Sex); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1605 (2010) (describing EEOC
Guidelines on Discrimination because of Religion); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1606 (describing EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination because of National Origin); 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1607 (describing EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures).
160. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 n.20 (1976) (per
curiam), superseded by statute, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 92
Stat. 2076, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012), as recognized in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 88 (1983).
161. See e.g., Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359,
374 (1998) (stating that the NLRB applied a “rule of primary conduct . . . different from the rule . . . formally announced").
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has harshly criticized the NLRB for its adjudication decision162
making.
Rulemaking is, “a potential remedy for . . . un163
checked abusive bureaucratic discretion.”
Rules establish
reasonable parameters on the exercise of administrative discretion and create certainty. In order for extant law as it has
heaved to and fro over the last few administrations to avoid becoming black letter law, we propose, as under Title VII, that
NLRA Section 6 be amended to limit NLRB rulemaking author164
ity to procedural and interpretive rules.
Rulemaking—even interpretive rulemaking—creates more
certainty for stakeholders. Even with interpretive rulemaking,
the agency is less likely to actively reverse prior guidance, because doing so would require it to provide a transparent explanation for its policy shifts in amending a rule if it aims to main165
tain judicial deference. At the same time the agency can offer
valuable policy guidance to parties.
Interpretive rules should be promulgated based on extant
NLRB law and continue to be promulgated in that manner. The
agency, as subject matter expert on the substantive law, would
provide important but not binding guidance for employers, employees, and unions with rules on which they could generally
rely (but would not be binding) until judicial review. Presumably the courts would give greater deference to longstanding
NLRB precedent, such as rules on solicitation and distribu166
tion, but more carefully scrutinize rules that more recently
expand existing law, such as the agency’s expansion of solicita167
tion rights to vendor/contractor employees. Preceding NLRB
162. See id.
163. KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 128, at 32 (“[O]ur . . . systems are
saturated with excessive discretionary power which needs to be confined,
structured, checked” (quoting Davis in Discretionary Power)).
164. As the Board’s recent experience with its’ employee NLRA rights poster reflects, even if we supported notice and comment rulemaking it would likely practically gridlock the agency. See Tuck, supra note 134, at 1121 (arguing
that “political divisions and intervention from the judiciary and from Congress” make notice and comment rulemaking “not feasible at the NLRB”).
“Since the NLRB has rarely used rulemaking for substantive policy issues,
parties would likely challenge the legitimacy of any proposed rule.” Id. at 1129
(footnotes omitted).
165. See John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
893, 930, 935–36 (2004) (“It is hard to see why an agency would have less of a
duty to adhere to—or explain when it wishes to depart from—a policy position
announced in a nonlegislative rule.”).
166. See, e.g., Our Way Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 394, 411 (1983) (establishing
time parameters of lawful solicitation and distribution rules).
167. See, e.g., New York New York, LLC, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 119, 9–10 (2011)
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decisional law not addressed in newly issued guidance or conflicting with such guidance would be of no force or effect other
than as relevant grounds upon which a reviewing court could
decide whether the Act has been violated, but that would not
rise even to the level of required deference upon review.
Reliance on interpretive rules would avoid judicial interference, as there would be no need to stay a rule that is adviso168
ry in nature only. Congressional initiatives to overturn an interpretive rule or policy statement would likely be virtually
non-existent in comparison to binding legislative rules. Interpretive rules would also effect savings in areas involving issues
that arise over and over and over again, and likely avoid the
unnecessary delays the Board is known for, and that are inherent in notice-and-comment rulemaking, as interpretive rules
would be valid immediately after Federal Register publica169
tion.
CONCLUSION
This article challenges a prevailing view that collective
representation laws are the Titanic, and that attempts to fix
170
them are rearranging the deck chairs. Prior reform attempts
have been unsuccessful because they were motivated either by
partisan politics, or were results-oriented, or both. The long list
of attempts to fix a broken system should not lead one to conclude that the system is unfixable. Nor should it lead one to
conclude that it is not worth it to attempt to amend the glaring
problems in this arena. However, it is clear that much work
needs to be done. Nothing will be accomplished in a climate
presupposing partisan motivation for change. Rather, we believe all stakeholders recognize at some level that the federal
labor law enforcement ship is sinking and that it benefits no
one to turn that ship into something that benefits one set of polarized interest groups over another. This is unfortunate because it creates an unnecessary barrier to meaningful reform.
(expanding solicitation rights to contractors).
168. Tuck, supra note 134, at 1146 (explaining that while non-binding policy statements can be subject to judicial review during an enforcement action,
there is generally no pre-enforcement judicial review delaying immediate enforcement).
169. Id. at 1132 n.118 (arguing that interpretive rulemaking would avoid
“lengthy” notice-and-comment process and expensive litigation).
170. See, e.g., Piore & Safford, supra note 29, at 321 (discussing the widespread acceptance that the New Deal system of collective bargaining has collapsed).
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While it occurs on a macro level because political interest
171
groups reactively devalue any proposal set forth by their opponents, it occurs on a micro level as well, when academics and
commentators immediately cast proposals as either “promanagement” or “pro-labor” based on criteria independent of
the merits. Dichotomization and reactive devaluation of proposals that do not emanate from a homophilous source reduce
the chances of meaningful reform.
Sadly, this problem might be unavoidable. Paradoxically, it
could be that the more one tries to present neutral ideas, the
more they will be ascribed as non-neutral, and perhaps worse,
the more likely they will be coopted by a non-neutral political
source and used for non-neutral ends. It may be that no matter
how neutral one wants to be, tries to be, or is, that it is unavoidable that non-neutral political leaning motives will be ascribed and coopted in this way. Sarat and Silbey aptly describe
the “pull” of neutral well-intentioned policy recommendations
172
for unwanted political ends. They write, “[p]olicy oriented
work which intends to be silent about its politics speaks none173
theless.”
The authors’ hope (perhaps too ambitious and optimistic) is
to break this vicious cycle of failure of reforms in labor law because of non-neutral ascription or motivation. By adopting a
perspective of administrative neutrality and focusing on procedural efficiency, we have attempted to craft a proposal that is
genuinely workable as a reform effort. On the net, the hope is
to restore credibility to the Board, which it so badly needs, and
to harmonize the NLRB’s structural enforcement mechanisms
with similarly situated governmental agencies. The net results
would benefit management and labor alike. Most importantly,
the net results would benefit employees and taxpayers in sig171. “Reactive devaluation” is a term used by social psychologists. See Lee
Ross & Andrew Ward, Psychological Barriers to Dispute Resolution, in 27
MARK ZANNA, ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 270 (vol. 27,
1995). It describes individuals’ deflation of their valuations of offers made by
their counterparts in a negotiation, on the spurious assumption that a counterpart’s proposal in her best interest is invariably contra the individual’s best
interest. Id. There is a substantial body of research on reactive valuation. See
id. at 255–304; Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict
Resolution, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 26–42 (Kenneth J. Arrow
et al. eds., 1995); Lee Ross & Constance Stillinger, Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 389–404 (1991).
172. See Austin Sarat & Susan S. Silbey, The Pull of the Policy Audience,
10 LAW & POL’Y 97, 122–32 (1988).
173. Id. at 142.
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nificant ways by increasing administrative efficiency, reducing
uncertainty in the law, and by augmenting transparency of rule
making. Perhaps even if Sarat and Silbey are right about the
paradoxical cooptation of this kind of proposal, one way to avoid
the serious negative consequences is to focus as we do on structural and procedural reforms that potentially benefit all parties. At least that is our genuine hope.

